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The Effect  of Quality Assurance  Policies  for
Processing Tomatoes on the Demand for Pesticides
S. Andrew  Starbird
In California, acceptance sampling is used to monitor the quality of processing
tomatoes delivered by growers to processors.  A proposal to change the current
quality assurance policy was recently put forth to reduce the growers'  incentive
to  use pesticides.  In  this article  we  examine  the effect  of alternative  quality
assurance policies on a profit-maximizing grower's demand for pesticides. The
results indicate that  the demand for pesticides is sensitive  to  changes  in the
quality assurance policy and that the proposed policy would reduce the optimal
level of  pesticide use on processing tomatoes. Disregarding the impact of quality
assurance  policy  may be the reason that the demand for pesticides  has been
underestimated  so often in the past.
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Introduction
The California processing tomato industry recently considered a proposal to increase the
acceptable level of insect damage in delivered loads of tomatoes from 2% to 3% by weight.
The objective  of this proposed  policy  change  was to reduce the growers'  motivation  to
use insecticides.  Although processing tomato growers strongly supported the change, pro-
cessors felt that the increased tolerance  would adversely affect the quality, or at least the
perceived  quality, of California's  processed  tomato products.  The proposal  was rejected
on this basis.
A question  that  was  never resolved  is whether  or  not the increased  tolerance would
actually result in less pesticide  use. The new policy  was supposed to reduce the grower's
motivation to use pesticides by making it easier to get insect-damaged tomatoes accepted.
California processing tomato  growers get most of their loads accepted  under the current
quality  assurance  policy by  delivering loads with damage  levels  far below the contract
specifications.  Even though integrated pest management (IPM) recommendations for pes-
ticide applications  are based  on a target of 2%  damage  at harvest (Wilson  et al.), most
loads of processing tomatoes in California show only a trace of insect damage-far below
the  2%  maximum  allowable.  In  1990,  only 56 of 380,822 inspected  loads were rejected
because of insect damage  (California Processing Tomato Advisory Board).
Given the public's continuing concern about the use of chemicals in food production,
quality  assurance  policy and its effect  on the use of pesticides  is likely to be a recurring
issue.  Unfortunately,  quality assurance  policy is overlooked  in most research concerning
pesticide productivity.
In this study, we present a model of a profit-maximizing processing tomato grower who
produces tomatoes with stochastic quality which are inspected using acceptance sampling.
We use the model to find the grower's profit-maximizing  level of pesticide use. The effect
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of alternative quality assurance policies is examined using numerical analysis.  In addition
to the proposed  increase  in tolerance  from  2%  to  3%,  we  consider three  other  quality
assurance  policies. These policy alternatives are designed to reduce the value or increase
the cost of using pesticides to reduce  insect damage.
In the next section, the model  is developed  using concepts  from both microeconomic
analysis  and acceptance  sampling theory.  The  validity of the model is then established
by comparing the model's solution with the limited data we have on the use of pesticides
in processing tomato production. The model is solved under a variety of policy alternatives
in the  succeeding section,  and last,  some conclusions  are drawn.
The Model
The grower's objective is to maximize expected profit. Profit is a random variable because
the grower's revenue  per load, R,  depends upon whether or not a load is accepted:
~~~~(I~)  R  =°rL  if accepted
R )[0  ~  if rejected,
where r is the contribution margin of the load ($/ton) excluding the cost of pest control,
and L is the size of the load (tons).  The conditional probability,  P(A  I 0), represents the
probability that a load is accepted  (event A) when the proportion  damaged in the load is
0.  The  proportion  damaged  in  the  load,  4,  is  a  random  variable  following  the joint
probability density function, h(0, x), where x is the number of pesticide applications. We
can write the marginal  probability  of acceptance  for a given number of pesticide  appli-
cations  as:
(2)  PA()  =  P(A  I ¢)h(0, x) do.
Expected  profit for the whole  farm depends on the cost of applying  pesticides  to the
whole  farm,  C(x),  and  on  total  production.  We  assume  that yield  is  independent  of
pesticide use because  the most common  processing  tomato pest,  Heliothis zea (H.  zea)
or tomato fruitworm,  typically  attacks  the fruit and not the plant (Statewide  Integrated
Pest Management  Project).  We  also assume that the pesticide  does not affect the plant.
If Y is total production  (tons) and L is the size of a load (tons/load), the number of loads
submitted for inspection is  Y/L, and the expected profit for the whole farm is:
(3)  ,(x)  = PA(x)rLY/L  - C(x),
= PA(x)rY  -C(x).
The Quality Assurance Policy
The conditional  probability  of acceptance,  P(A  I 0), is defined by the quality assurance
policy.  Most  analyses of pesticide  productivity  assume  100%  inspection,  implying  that
every bad unit can be identified and isolated,  and that P(A  II  ) =  1 - (e.g.,  Headley;
Campbell;  Lichtenberg  and  Zilberman;  Babcock,  Lichtenberg,  and  Zilberman).  This is
rarely  the case  in agricultural  production  systems,  and it is certainly  not the  case  with
processing tomatoes, because testing for worm damage is destructive.  The more common
quality assurance  policy is the use of sampling inspection. With sampling inspection,  the
characteristics of a randomly drawn sample are used to determine the fate of a submitted
load.
Processing  tomatoes  are evaluated  using  a double-sample  inspection  plan.  A typical
double-sample inspection policy involves drawing a sample of size n,, accepting the load
if the number of defectives in the sample is no more than cl, and rejecting the load if the
number of defectives is more than c2 (c2 > c,). If the number of defectives is more than
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c, and no more than c2, a second sample  of size  n2 is drawn and the load is accepted  if
the sum of the defectives from the first and second samples is no more than c3,  where c3
- c2  (see Montgomery  for a detailed description  of double-sample  inspection  policies).
With this quality assurance  policy, the conditional  probability of acceptance  is:
C 1 C 2 C 3 - d 1
(4)  P(A  I  )  =  ~  f(d,  I n,  0)+  +  f(d  ,  n ,,)f(d 2 In2,  ),
dl=0  dl=cl  +1  d 2=0
where Jdi,  I n,  0) is the probability of observing d, defectives in a sample of size ni, given
that the proportion  defective in the load is 0.
The exact distribution of the number of defectives in a  sample is hypergeometric,  but
if the sample  size is small relative  to the  size of the  load,  a binomial approximation  to
the hypergeometric  distribution can be used (Montgomery,  pp.  36-39).  Since processing
tomato  loads are about  25 tons and the  samples  are  100 pounds,  we can safely  use the
binomial approximation:
(5)  f(di  I ni, 0b)  = (i)I(l  - ck)n'-.
The Prior  Distribution
The most difficult relationship  to define in this model is the prior distribution of quality,
h(¢, x). The exact shape of h(0, x) depends on the location of the field, the tomato variety,
and the maturity date (late maturing varieties are more prone to infestation). Some growers
have consistently low damage levels,  while others face chronic infestations.  To estimate
h(0, x),  we would need  to acquire data that relate x,  the level of pesticide use,  to 0, the
proportion damaged in loads. These data would be expensive to collect since 0 is a measure
of the actual proportion damaged in a load and therefore requires the inspection of each
tomato. Recently, the California Processing Tomato Advisory Board began collecting data
on pesticide use,  but its surveys are not matched to damage  levels.
We can get an idea of the range of the distribution of 0, when no damage control efforts
are undertaken (x = 0),  from the trials performed by Zalom, Wilson, and Hoffman. They
examined the  effect of the timing of infestations by H. zea,  the intensity of infestations,
and tomato variety on the proportion damaged at harvest. The results of their experiments
indicate that  the  mean  proportion  damaged  at  harvest  is between  1 and  3% when  no
damage  control  efforts  are  undertaken.  The  maximum  mean  proportion  damaged  was
about 6%.
Some information  about the shape of h((,  x) can be gleaned from the inspection data
collected  by the  California Processing  Tomato Advisory  Board.  Of all the loads graded
in  1990, 97.9%  had no worm damage or only trace damage in  samples,  99.7% had .5%
or less damage in samples,  and 99.9%  had  1%  damage or less in samples.  Unfortunately,
these data represent the sampling distribution of damage after pesticides have been used.
They support,  however, a common assumption among growers and processors that most
loads have little or no damage and that the frequency  of high damage levels  is relatively
low (i.e., the distribution of quality has an exponential shape).
We  assume that  when x =  0,  the damage  level at harvest  (0) follows  a rescaled  beta
distribution with parameters  (a, f)  = (1,  4).  These parameters give the beta distribution
an exponential  shape. To test the sensitivity of the results to the shape of the distribution,
we also solve the model with (a, A) = (6, 6), which gives the 0 distribution an approximately
normal  shape,  and with (a, f)  = (1, 1),  which  gives the 0 distribution a uniform shape.
The beta distribution was chosen because it is often used to represent the prior distribution
in studies of quality assurance  policy  (e.g.,  Moskowitz  and Plante; Stuart,  Montgomery,
and Heikes).  The beta distribution can represent a wide variety of shapes, it is tractable,
and the distribution of defectives in samples,  d, is relatively insensitive to misestimation
of the beta distribution's parameters  (Weiler).
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Figure 1.  Distribution of 4 at different levels of susceptibility to infestation when x =  0
To represent  different  degrees  of susceptibility  to infestations,  we define  three distri-
butions of  when x = 0. We rescale the beta distribution from [0,  1] to [0, qo] (qo represents
maximum  damage level  when no pesticides  are  used, i.e.,  when x =  0), where  qO  = .05
represents  low susceptibility,  qO  =  .10  represents  moderate  susceptibility,  and  qO  =  .15
represents high  susceptibility  to infestations.  When (a, f)  = (1,  4) and x =  0, the mean
damage is .01 for the low-susceptibility grower, .02 for the moderate-susceptibility grower,
and  .03  for the high-susceptibility grower. These means are consistent with the results of
Zalom, Wilson, and Hoffman.  These three distributions  are illustrated in figure  1 for the
case of (a, B) = (1, 4).
Starbird82  July1994
Proportion  of  Fields
0.4
- 0.295
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Journal  ofAgricultural  and Resource Economics
0.002  0.002
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
Number  of  Applications
Source:  California  Tomato  Growers  Assoc.
Figure 2.  Frequency  of pesticide  applications in 1989
The Quality Improvement Function
We assume that efforts  directed toward controlling  insect  damage  shift the distribution
of 0 toward zero damage, in effect rescaling h(¢, x) over a smaller range with a maximum
closer to zero. The effect of pesticide applications, x, is defined by a quality improvement
function, q(x), where q(x) is the maximum damage level at different values of x [q, is the
maximum damage level for the special case ofx = 0, i. e., q(0) = q0]. Although no estimates
of q(x) are available,  we assume that q'(x) < 0 and that q"(x) > 0, over the relevant range
ofx. We can get an idea of the relevant range ofx from surveys conducted by the California
Tomato  Growers  Association.  In  the  1989  growing  season,  the number  of insecticide
treatments  applied  by surveyed  growers  ranged  from  zero  to nine.  The distribution  of
applications in 1989 is shown in figure  2 (California Tomato Growers Association).
We  assume that the quality improvement  function  has  an exponential  form,  q(x)  =
q0EXP(-Xx), where X  is a parameter defined by the effectiveness of the pesticide. This is
the functional form used by Harper and Zilberman to relate pounds of pesticide  used to
percentage  yield lost due to pest damage.  We define  three values of X  corresponding  to
pesticides with low effectiveness  (X  = .4),  moderate effectiveness (X  =  .6), and high effec-
tiveness (X  = .8). The values of q(x) for the three levels of pesticide effectiveness are shown
in figure  3.
Other Parameters
The model assumes that the grower operates a 700-acre farm in Yolo County,  California,
and that the yield  is the  1990  statewide  average  of 30  tons per acre.  The contribution
margin, excluding worm-control  costs, is $7.42  per ton. Worm-control  costs are  $24.76Quality Assurance Policies and Pesticide Demand  83
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Figure 3.  Quality improvement  functions for different levels of pesticide effectiveness
per application per acre, or about $.83 per application per ton (Yolo County Cooperative
Extension Service). In addition, we assume that tomatoes are shipped in 25-ton loads and
that the  grower is paid for 25 tons, regardless  of whether one or two samples  are drawn.
Model Validity
To  test the  validity  of the  model,  the  optimal  number  of pesticide  applications  was
calculated for the three levels of susceptibility and the three levels of pesticide effectiveness
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IJournal  of Agricultural  and  Resource Economics
Table  1.  Optimal Number of Pesticide Applications  under the Current Quality Assurance  Policy
Pesticide  Effectiveness  (X):  .8  .8  .8  .6  .6  .6  .4  .4  .4
Field Susceptibility (q):  .05  .10  .15  .05  .10  .15  .05  .10  .15
Optimal No. of Applications  (x*)  1  2  2  1  2  3  2  3  4
Mean Damage Level, given x*  .0045  .0040  .0061  .0055  .0060  .0050  .0045  .0060  .0061
Prob. of Acceptance,  given x*  .9983  .9994  .9860  .9923  .9865  .9962  .9983  .9865  .9860
Consumer's Risk, given x*  .0001  <.0001  .0070  .0031  .0067  .0009  .0001  .0067  .0070
Producer's Risk, given x*  .0018  .0007  .0078  .0055  .0076  .0033  .0018  .0076  .0078
under the current quality assurance  policy.  Since the current policy  is defined by weight,
while the probability  of acceptance  is based on numbers  of tomatoes  [see equation  (4)],
we used  a conversion  factor  of six  tomatoes  per pound  to  calculate the  probability  of
acceptance. Under this assumption,  n  = n2= 600 tomatoes (100  lbs.), c,  =  12 tomatoes
(2% of 100  lbs.),  c2 =  18  tomatoes  (3%  of 100 lbs.), and  c3 = 24  tomatoes  (2%  of 200
lbs.).
The optimal  number of pesticide  applications  was found by calculating  the expected
profit [equation  (3)]  for integer values for the number of pesticide applications  (x). The
optimal number of pesticide  applications, x*,  the mean damage  in delivered loads given
x*, the probability  of load acceptance  given x*, and the consumer's  and producer's risk
given x* are shown in table 1 for all nine cases of pesticide effectiveness and susceptibility
to infestation.  The consumer's risk is the probability that a rejectable  load is accepted,
r0
(6)  Rc =  P(A  I q)h((,  x) do,
.02
and the producer's risk is the probability  that an acceptable load is rejected,
.02
(7)  R  =  (1  - P(A  I 0))h(0, x) do.
The optimal numbers of applications shown in table  1 are within the range of pesticide
use recorded by the California Tomato Growers Association in 1989 and  1990. Also, the
optimal  mean  damage  level  is  about  .5%,  which  is  consistent with the distribution  of
damage  recorded  by the  California  Processing  Tomato  Advisory  Board in  1990.  The
results in table  1 should not be taken  as recommendations  for pesticide use,  since they
depend  on the assumptions  regarding  susceptibility  to infestations  and  pesticide  effec-
tiveness.  However,  they  can be  used  as  a baseline  for measuring  the  effect  of quality
assurance  policy  changes  on the optimal use of pesticides.
Policy  Analysis
We consider four different  quality assurance policy alternatives: increase  tolerance from
2% to 3% damage (alternative A), increase the sample size from 100 pounds to 200 pounds
(alternative  B),  place  a  100%  surcharge  on  the price  of pesticides  (alternative  C), and
100% inspection (alternative D). Alternatives  A  and B are  designed to reduce the value
of pesticides to growers, while alternative  C is designed to increase the cost of pesticides.
Alternative  D is the quality assurance  policy that is implicitly  assumed in most studies
of pesticide productivity.
The optimal  number of pesticide  applications  changes when the parameters  of the  k
distribution are changed from (a, i)  = (1,  4) to either (a,  3) = (6, 6)  or (a, A) = (1,  1). The
normally shaped beta distribution,  (a, f)  = (6,  6),  and the uniformly shaped beta distri-
bution,  (a, f)  =  (1,  1),  result  in slightly  higher optimal  pesticide  applications,  because
these distributions have higher densities at the higher levels of damage. These distributions
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also  result  in  larger  decreases  in  the  optimal  number  of pesticide  applications  when
compared to the exponentially  shaped beta distribution.  For example,  when (a,  3) = (6,
6),  policy  alternative  A  results  in a one-application  decrease  in the optimum in all but
one case. Our results show that the policy changes have  a greater effect on pesticide usage
when (a, 0) = (6, 6) or (a, 3) = (1, 1) than when (a, /)  = (1, 4).  To avoid overstating  the
effect of the proposed policy changes, the remainder of the results presented in this article
are for an exponentially shaped beta distribution of c, i.e.,  (a, ()  = (1, 4).
Policy Alternative A: Increased Tolerance
Policy  alternative A  represents  the  policy  modification  recently  considered  by the  Cali-
fornia  processing  tomato  industry.  This  modification  would  increase  the  tolerance  for
insect  damage  from  2%  to  3% by weight.  We assume that the  same double-sample  in-
spection procedure  would be used under the new policy and that a second sample  would
be drawn if the first sample had between 3% and 4% damage. Under these assumptions,
n,  =  n2 = 600 tomatoes (100  lbs.),  cl  =  18 tomatoes (3%  of 100 lbs.),  c2 = 24 tomatoes
(4% of 100 lbs.), and c3 =  36 tomatoes  (3% of 200 lbs.).
This quality  assurance  policy  results  in the  optimal  pesticide  applications  shown  in
table  2.  In  five  of the  nine  cases,  the  optimal number  of pesticide  applications  is  less
under alternative A.  Growers who use the most effective  pesticides  decrease the number
of pesticide  applications in one case, while growers who use the least effective  pesticides
reduce their pesticide use in all cases. These results imply that this proposed policy could
indeed  have an impact  on the amount of pesticides  used by processing  tomato growers.
Growers who are susceptible to infestation and who use less effective  pesticides are most
likely to reduce pesticide use because additional applications have a relatively low marginal
value.
As one would expect, increasing the tolerance results in a slightly higher average damage
level, increased consumer's risk, and decreased producer's risk. Alternative A significantly
increases the probability  that a processor  will get  a load with more than  2%  damage.  In
this respect,  the processor's  concerns  about the effect of this proposal on the quality  of
delivered tomatoes  are not unfounded.
Policy Alternative B: Doubling the Sample Size
A common practice  in many industries is to increase the sample  size used  in receiving
inspection to improve the accuracy of inspection. Increasing the accuracy reduces the risk
facing growers delivering acceptable loads, but increases the risk facing growers delivering
rejectable  loads.  Theoretically,  as the accuracy improves,  growers  submitting  acceptable
loads  can relax  their  damage-control  efforts,  while  growers  submitting  rejectable  loads
will strengthen  their damage-control  efforts.
Under alternative  B, we double the sample  size from  100 pounds  to 200 pounds  and
maintain  the  tolerance  level at  2%  by weight,  so  n,  =  n2 =  1,200  tomatoes,  c,  =  24
tomatoes  (2%  of 200 lbs.),  c2 = 36 tomatoes (3% of 200 lbs.), and c3 = 48 tomatoes (2%
of 400 lbs.).  As  shown in table 3,  doubling the sample  size has no effect on the optimal
number of pesticide applications.  The producer's and consumer's risks change very little
under  this alternative,  because the increased  accuracy  from doubling the sample  size is
not very significant when  the load size is so large.
Policy Alternative C: 100% Surcharge
This policy alternative  differs from  the others in that it is designed  to affect  the cost of
reducing insect  damage  rather than the benefit associated  with reducing  insect damage.
Although doubling  the cost would have a tremendous effect on the use of most inputs, it
seems to have a small effect on the optimal number of pesticide applications (table 4).  In
only  one  case  does  the  100%  surcharge  result  in  an  effective  reduction  in  the  use  of
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Table 3.  Optimal Number of Pesticide  Applications  under Policy Alternative B
Pesticide Effectiveness  (X):  .8  .8  .8  .6  .6  .6  .4  .4  .4
Field Susceptibility  (q):  .05  .10  .15  .05  .10  .15  .05  .10  .15
Optimal No. of Applications (x*)  1  2  2  1  2  3  2  3  4
Mean Damage Level, given x*  .0045  .0040  .0061  .0055  .0060  .0050  .0045  .0060  .0061
Prob. of Acceptance, given x*  .9992  .9999  .9876  .9940  .9880  .9976  .9992  .9880  .9876
Consumer's Risk, given x*  .0001  <.0001  .0060  .0027  .0058  .0008  .0001  .0058  .0060
Producer's  Risk, given x*  .0001  .0002  .0052  .0035  .0051  .0019  .0009  .0051  .0052
pesticides.  In this one case, the reduction in the optimal application rate causes an increase
in the  average  damage  level  which  results  in an  increase  in both  the  consumer's  and
producer's risk.
These results imply that the grower's demand for pesticides is very inelastic in the region
of the optimum,  and  so  policies  that  directly  or  indirectly  affect  the marginal  cost  of
pesticides will be ineffective  in reducing  their use.
Policy Alternative D: 100% Inspection
The last policy alternative,  100% inspection,  implies that every bad tomato can be iden-
tified and isolated and, therefore, P(A  I  ) =  1 - 0. By substituting P(A  I 0) = 1 - 0 for
(4) in the model and solving,  we get the optimal values presented in table 5.
In eight of the nine cases considered under alternative D, the optimal number of  pesticide
applications  is 0.  In  all  cases,  100%  inspection  results in a lower  level of pesticide  use
than  the  current  sampling  inspection  policy  (table  1).  With  100%  inspection,  a high
proportion  of delivered  loads is accepted  without using any pesticides,  and so the value
of pesticides is much  less than when  sampling inspection  is used.  In addition,  provided
the inspection is accurate,  there is no consumer's or producer's risk because every tomato
is examined  individually;  thus, there  is no  risk of accepting bad tomatoes  or rejecting
good tomatoes.
These results contribute to our understanding of why many growers appear to use more
pesticides than are predicted by econometric analysis (see Campbell;  Headley;  Carrasco-
Tauber and Moffit). If 100% inspection is assumed and sampling inspection actually used,
then  a model of grower behavior will  severely undervalue  pesticides  and it will  appear
that growers  apply far more pesticides  than is warranted.
Conclusions
Several important  conclusions  can be  drawn  from  this  analysis.  First,  the proposal  to
increase the tolerance for insect  damage  is likely to result in less pesticide  use by some
expected  profit-maximizing  growers.  This  conclusion  is  based  on the  assumptions  re-
garding: (a) the distribution of the damage level, h(0, x), although the results appear robust
Table 4.  Optimal Number of Pesticide  Applications under Policy  Alternative C
Pesticide Effectiveness  (X):  .8  .8  .8  .6  .6  .6  .4  .4  .4
Field Susceptibility  (qo):  .05  .10  .15  .05  .10  .15  .05  .10  .15
Optimal No. of Applications  (x*)  1  2  2  1  2  3  1  3  4
Mean Damage Level,  given x*  .0045  .0040  .0061  .0055  .0060  .0050  .0067  .0060  .0061
Prob. of Acceptance, given x*  .9983  .9994  .9860  .9923  .9865  .9962  .9762  .9865  .9860
Consumer's Risk, given x*  .0001  <.0001  .0071  .0031  .0067  .0009  .0128  .0067  .0070
Producer's Risk, given x*  .0018  .0007  .0078  .0055  .0076  .0033  .0102  .0076  .0078
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Table 5.  Optimal Number of Pesticide  Applications  under Policy  Alternative D
Pesticide Effectiveness  (X):  .8  .8  .8  .6  .6  .6  .4  .4  .4
Field Susceptibility  (qo):  .05  .10  .15  .05  .10  .15  .05  .10  .15
Optimal No. of Applications  (x*)  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0
Mean Damage Level, given x*  .0100  .0200  .0135  .0100  .0200  .0300  .0100  .0200  .0300
Prob. of Acceptance, given x*  .9901  .9801  .9866  .9901  .9801  .9701  .9901  .9801  .9701
Consumer's Risk, given x*  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Producer's  Risk, given x*  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
with respect to this assumption; (b) the relationship between pesticide use and the damage
level,  q(x); and (c)  the  level of susceptibility  to infestation,  q0. In general,  growers  who
use  less effective  pesticides  and who  are more  susceptible  to infestation  are also  more
sensitive to  changes in the quality assurance  policy. Further research  should be focused
on specifying and estimating the functions h(k, x) and q(x).
Second, a grower's  demand for pesticides appears to be very inelastic in the neighbor-
hood of the optimal solution.  This implies that  efforts designed  to increase the cost of
pesticides  are  not likely  to  significantly  reduce  pesticide  use. This conclusion  calls into
question the value of  pesticide residue limitations which are designed to indirectly increase
the cost of pesticide use. Finally, econometric models that assume  100% inspection when
sampling inspection is actually used are likely to severely undervalue pesticides. This may
be the  reason  that models developed  by  Headley,  by Lichtenberg  and  Zilberman  (see
Carrasco-Tauber  and  Moffit),  and  by others  do not accurately  predict  the demand  for
pesticides by farmers.
[Received October 1992; final revision received December 1993.]
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